

Executive Registry
74-6242/1

ER 74-6242/1

DD/A 74-4717

13 December 1974

DD/A Registry
Special Training

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

Sir:

In response to your request concerning the possibility of a videotape briefing on "Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Conflict," NIE 11-3/8-74, I have been led to believe that the issue is now a settled one. We did have a more formal reply going to you but, from our perspective, it really went more into the aspects of videotaping as opposed to the more substantive question that you raised.



John F. Blake
Deputy Director
for
Administration

STATINTL

cc: DDCI
ER
DD/I
D/DCI/NIO

STATINTL

cc: D/OTR
D/OS



STATINTL

Per instructions of [redacted] EO-DD/A
copies of DD/A 4717, dtd 13 Dec (Revised) were
given to D/OTR and D/OS on 17 Dec 1974.

DCI/DDCI
Routing Slip

Executive Registry

74-6242

TO:

		ACTION	INFO.			ACTION	INFO.
1	DCI			11	LC		
2	DDCI			12	IG		
3	S/MC			13	Compt		
4	DDS&T	✓		14	Asst/DCI		
5	DDI	✓		15	AO/DCI		
6	DDA	✓		16	Ex/Sec		
7	DDO			17			
8	D/DCI/IC	✓		18			
9	D/DCI/NIO	✓		19			
10	GC			20			

SUSPENSE

Date

Remarks:

Idea —

Since most top customers of 11-3/8 will actually receive it orally (with charts) could we not prepare a videotape briefing so that our stress and subtlety gets through instead of a briefing officer's? — At the cost of 11-3/8 (\$1,000,000,000 by my estimate) the clarity would be a form of insurance on the investment —

DCI/DDCI

11/13/74 WFC

Approved For Release 2001/04/01 : CIA-RDP86B00963R000100080006-2

OTR-4019

26 NOV 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Observations on Capabilities for Video-tape
Recording of Classified Briefing

1. The Office of Training has the studio facilities, the equipment, and the personnel needed to record, duplicate, and playback video tapes in black and white only. We can record directly on 1" reel-to-reel; 1/2" reel-to-reel; and 3/4" videocassette. Using 1" tape as the master copy to ensure highest quality original recording, we can duplicate tapes for playback in both the 1/2" reel-to-reel and the 3/4" videocassette formats. All recording equipment can be moved from the studio in the Chamber of Commerce Building to any number of Headquarters or other "on-site" locations with the dimensions and attributes necessary to two-camera videotaping operations. The Office of Training also has the capability to design and manufacture two- and three-dimensional visual aids suitable for videotaping. The actual recording of a briefing can be begun at the Chamber of Commerce Building with two to three hours of lead-time. Recording to be accomplished at other sites may require up to a full day's notice. The cost of a recording session depends upon the accounting systems employed, and may range from merely the cost of the tapes actually used to a somewhat higher figure which would include preparation, production, and editing time for all personnel involved.

2. The Office of Training does not now have the equipment or the optimum facilities for recording video tape in color. The cost of basic equipment--excluding color videotape recorders, which we do have--probably would be in the neighborhood of \$75,000 today. We are not aware of any color cameras or related studio color facilities in the Agency today. It could take two months or more to acquire color production equipment; install it in the OTR studio, and test it. To acquire more suitable space than the present studio would add considerably to the pre-production time frame. None of the present OTR personnel engaged in video work are experienced in operations in color. While the

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difference in some ways is virtually negligible, this lack of experience cannot be overlooked completely. As in the case of black and white recordings, OTR can provide visual aids for color operations.

3. The National Security Agency has an operating color capability housed at the National Cryptologic School at Friendship Airport. The Office of Training has made use of this facility in the past and has found the equipment and personnel to be of the highest quality. In the past, NSA has not charged OTR for use of facilities, personnel, or equipment. In addition, NSA has suggested informally that their capabilities for color video production could be usefully considered as central facilities for the Intelligence Community. These facilities include the production of necessary visual aids.

4. In terms of the specific briefing and customers under consideration, a color videotape appears to be a vastly superior medium. Given the potential use of videotape for briefings, it seems imperative to attempt a pilot project in this particular instance. The options, in order of preference, are the following:

a. Make arrangements with NSA to use their capability for color videotape recording.

b. Use OTR capability to produce a black and white videotape recording.

c. Authorize a crash program to establish a color production facility in CIA.

d. Investigate the capabilities of other organizations with color facilities (AEC in Germantown; Naval Pictorial Center near Bolling AFB @ 600/day) to satisfy the immediate requirement within specified time limits.



Alfonso Rodriguez
Director of Training

STATINTL

26 NOV 1974

MEMORANDUM FOR: Deputy Director for Administration

SUBJECT : Videotape Briefings on Sensitive
National Estimates

1. This memorandum addresses the security aspects of a suggestion made by the Director, that the vehicle of videotape be explored as an aid to the presentation of briefings on sensitive estimative papers, such as the recent NIE on "Soviet Forces for International Conflict." It is understood that a separate paper is being prepared by the Director of Training related to the technical aspects involved in the production of the videotape briefings.

2. Three security aspects of the instant problem are addressed below, namely: (1) the application of security controls, (2) appropriate notification to viewers as to the sensitivity of the material presented, and (3) the possibility of equipment emanation.

a. Security Controls: It is desirable that security controls be such as to encompass the circumstances, physical location and attendance at the viewing. This would suggest that the videotape should at all times remain under the control of the CIA. In this manner the CIA will be able to assess any security problems involved in the physical location of the viewing, in addition to any other special security considerations that may be involved, and can restrict access in accordance with the relative sensitivity of the briefing material. At such time as it may be decided to disseminate copies of the videotape


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to the control of other departments, a set of carefully devised security guidelines should accompany. Other aspects related to security controls should include an appropriate document control number and security caveats--e.g.: TOP SECRET, Handle Via TALENT-KEYHOLE And COMINT Controls--to appear on the videotape canister (or cassette), and a register of all viewers to be maintained on a continuing basis--preferably stored with the videotape canister.

b. Notification of Sensitivity: In order that all viewers will be appropriately notified of the applicable security classification, controls and sensitivity of the material presented, it is suggested that, following presentation of title, the videotape portray these classification, control and sensitivity aspects as they are portrayed on the cover of the respective estimative paper.

c. Equipment Emanation: The Office of Security, of course, is not the appropriate authority to fully assess the TEMPEST problem. I am informally advised, however, that the problem varies, according to the particular equipment used, and according to the perimeter construction of the viewing area. I am also advised that Office of Communications testing of the Sony Video System concluded that a picture was detectable to a distance of thirty-five (35) feet. From this I would conclude that the TEMPEST problem can be adequately dealt with through careful selection of the viewing equipment and the environmental conditions surrounding the viewing. It may be necessary that the Agency provide the viewing equipment for each showing.

3. In conclusion, it is the opinion of this office that no insurmountable security problems are involved in the Director's suggestion to use videotape as an aid to the presentation of briefings on sensitive estimative papers.


Charles W. Kane
Director of Security

25X1A

FACT

A highly classified two-volume report, or estimate has been prepared on "Soviet Forces for International Conflict". This is a detailed study with a number of background charts.

PROBLEM

The DCI has come up with a new idea and has asked for "comments" from five senior officers, including the DD/Administration. "Since most top customers of NIE 11-3/8-74 will actually receive it orally (with charts), could we not prepare a videotape briefing so that our stress and subtlety gets through instead of the briefing officer's?" The estimate was prepared at tremendous cost, and "the clarity would be a form of insurance on the investment".

ASSUMPTIONS

1. The DCI will be getting a solid cross section of opinion from senior advisors before he proceeds with the plan.
2. The videotape must be of good quality, possibly in color, to be shown at the Ford-Kissinger-Schlesinger level.
3. If the procedure is adopted for this estimate, the program will be expanded in the future.
4. The videotape is highly sensitive, and will have to be tightly controlled under compartmentation guidelines.
5. The DD/I, or the NIO will probably furnish the briefing officer -- but this may be open for discussion.

QUESTIONS

1. What is the OTR technical competence at present?
2. If we do not have the capability, can we develop it in a hurry?
3. What will be the best cost estimate?

4. Can we do something on a trial run basis and see how it works -- the same approach that was followed with the Colby intelligence newspaper?
5. What are the security ramifications of going the videotape route?

ACTION

1. OTR and OS to prepare appropriate comments to the DD/Administration; or
2. OTR to prepare comments to the DCI for the signature of the DD/Administration with appropriate input by the Office of Security

SUSPENSE: Suggest Friday, 29 November 1974

Meeting with [REDACTED] on STATINTL
21 Nov 1974, discussing all the ramifications
& options. Most likely favored approach
will be do go first class, in color, using
the facilities of NSA. Two separate papers
will be prepared, and I will handle the
covering memo. The new suspense, as
agreed, is close of business. Tuesday, 26
November 1974.

J